Nimeiri derrocado en Sudán - Historia

Nimeiri derrocado en Sudán - Historia

El general Nimeiri fue derrocado en Sudán después de servir como jefe de gobierno desde 1969. Nimeiri luchó para reprimir una rebelión en el sur no musulmán. Impuso la ley islámica, pero perdió casi todo el apoyo. En abril, una revuelta militar encabezada por el ministro de Defensa, Abdel Raham Siwar el-Dahab, destituyó a Nimeiri del poder.

Muere el ex presidente Nimeiri de Sudán y # 039s aliado de Estados Unidos

El ex presidente sudanés Jaafar Nimeiri, quien trajo la ley islámica a Sudán y se convirtió en un aliado cercano de Estados Unidos antes de ser derrocado en un golpe de Estado en 1985, murió a la edad de 79 años el sábado, dijeron funcionarios del gobierno.

& ampquot Esperábamos esto por un tiempo, había desarrollado una enfermedad. Hoy murió, dijo a Reuters el asistente presidencial Magdi Abdel Aziz.

Nimeiry será enterrado el domingo en Jartum y la ciudad gemela de Omdurman, donde nació en enero de 1930, dijo la televisión estatal citando una declaración del presidente y la oficina de Omdurman.

"Estaba demasiado enfermo para ser sacado del país para recibir tratamiento", dijo su secretaria Makkawi Ahmed, sin dar más detalles sobre su enfermedad.

Nimeiri llegó al poder en un golpe de 1969 que puso fin a cinco años de gobierno civil empañado por la corrupción y los problemas económicos.

Pasó 16 tormentosos años como líder sudanés hasta que él mismo fue derrocado en 1985 y se le concedió asilo político en Egipto.

Esperábamos esto por un tiempo, había desarrollado una enfermedad. Hoy el murió

Asistente presidencial Magdi Abdel Aziz

Presidencia de Nimeiri

Un musulmán devoto, Nimeiri comenzó su gobierno como un admirador de izquierda del fallecido presidente de Egipto, Gamal Abdel Nasser, pero gradualmente se desplazó hacia la derecha para convertirse en un aliado de Estados Unidos, aplastando insurrecciones de grupos musulmanes e izquierdistas.

Impuso la ley islámica sharia en 1983, un acto que es ampliamente visto como el principal catalizador de una guerra de 22 años que enfrentó al norte musulmán contra el sur principalmente cristiano.

El crecimiento económico de Sudán se detuvo durante su gobierno con largas colas para la gasolina y otros productos básicos.

A principios de 1985, sus problemas se vieron agravados por una deuda externa de $ 9 mil millones, una afluencia de refugiados de países vecinos y una devastadora sequía.

La ejecución del teólogo liberal Mahmoud Mohamed Taha por sedición también avivó la oposición a su gobierno.

Cuando voló a Washington menos de un mes antes de su derrocamiento para buscar más ayuda de Estados Unidos, estallaron disturbios que llevaron a su caída.

Después de un período de gobierno civil, el actual presidente de Sudán, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, tomó el poder en 1989.

Nimeiri regresó a Sudán en 1999 después de 14 años de exilio en El Cairo e hizo llamados a la unidad nacional, pero jugó poco papel en la política sudanesa después de su regreso.


Una cronología de los acontecimientos clave de la revolución inconclusa de Sudán

EL CAIRO - Las fuerzas de seguridad de Sudán dispersaron violentamente el lunes el campamento en el centro del movimiento de protesta que en abril obligó al ejército a destituir al hombre fuerte de Sudán, Omar al-Bashir, después de 30 años de gobierno, y luego se quedaron en las calles para mantenerse al día. presión sobre los generales que ocuparon su lugar.

Durante meses, decenas de miles en el campamento y otros sitios de protesta han estado exigiendo una transición rápida a un gobierno civil. La disolución de la sentada amenaza con escalar la lucha entre los manifestantes y el ejército a un nivel nuevo y más volátil.

Muchos líderes de la protesta ven el enfrentamiento con el ejército como parte de la lucha para purgar las instituciones estatales del ejército de al-Bashir y los partidarios islamistas. El tiempo del autócrata en el poder probablemente será recordado como uno de los más opresivos de la historia moderna de Sudán.

Aquí hay una cronología de eventos clave en el ascenso y caída de al-Bashir y la revolución inconclusa de Sudán:

Década de 1980: oficial del ejército de carrera, al-Bashir asume un papel de liderazgo en la guerra contra los rebeldes en el sur.

1985 - El ejército sudanés derroca al ex presidente Jaafar al-Nimeiri en un golpe incruento. El ejército entrega rápidamente el poder a un gobierno electo, que resulta disfuncional y solo gobierna durante unos años.

1989 - Liderando una alianza del ejército y los islamistas de línea dura, al-Bashir da un golpe de estado contra el primer ministro Sadiq al-Mahdi, disolviendo el gobierno y todos los partidos políticos. Se nombra presidente del Consejo del Comando Revolucionario para la Salvación Nacional, que gobierna el país, y es nombrado ministro de Defensa.

1990 - El intento de golpe no logra derrocar a al-Bashir.

1991 - Al-Bashir y sus aliados islamistas imponen la ley islámica o Sharia, lo que alimenta la división entre el norte musulmán y arabizado del país y el sur, principalmente animista y cristiano.

Agosto de 1993: el Departamento de Estado de EE. UU. Incluye a Sudán como estado patrocinador del terrorismo.

Octubre de 1993: Al-Bashir es nombrado presidente.

1996 - Al-Bashir es reelegido presidente.

1997 - Estados Unidos impone sanciones contra el gobierno de Sudán, acusándolo de apoyar el terrorismo.

Junio ​​de 1998: los legisladores sudaneses redactan una nueva constitución que levanta la prohibición de los partidos políticos.

Diciembre: Al-Bashir disuelve el parlamento después de que un aliado político islamista propone leyes que limitan los poderes del presidente.

2000 - Al-Bashir gana otra elección presidencial con más del 85% de los votos.

2003 - Grupos rebeldes en Darfur atacan al gobierno en un levantamiento contra presuntos abusos y malos tratos por parte de las autoridades. Al-Bashir busca la ayuda de las milicias Janjaweed, cuyas brutales tácticas aterrorizan a la gente en la región y desplazan a más de 2 millones de personas. Llega una pequeña fuerza de mantenimiento de la paz de la Unión Africana.

2005 - Bajo presión internacional, se alcanza un acuerdo de paz entre al-Bashir y el grupo rebelde del sur de Sudán, el Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo de Sudán. El acuerdo otorga a los sudaneses del sur el derecho a determinar si el sur seguirá siendo parte de Sudán.

Julio de 2008: el fiscal jefe de la Corte Penal Internacional pide una orden de arresto contra al-Bashir, citando cargos de crímenes de lesa humanidad, crímenes de guerra y genocidio en Darfur. El gobierno sudanés, que no es parte en el tratado que crea la CPI, niega las acusaciones y proclama la inocencia de al-Bashir.

Marzo de 2009 - La CPI emite una orden de arresto contra al-Bashir, la primera vez que la CPI busca el arresto de un jefe de estado en funciones, acusándolo de crímenes de guerra y crímenes de lesa humanidad, pero no de genocidio. Más tarde, se emite una segunda orden de arresto contra al-Bashir, esta vez con un cargo de genocidio.

Abril de 2010: Al-Bashir es reelegido con alrededor del 68% de los votos en las primeras elecciones multipartidistas del país en más de 20 años. Dos principales rivales de la oposición se retiran por supuestas prácticas fraudulentas.

Julio de 2011: Sudán del Sur obtiene la independencia después de un referéndum en enero. La independencia de Sudán del Sur causa dificultades económicas en Sudán a medida que el nuevo país gana control sobre los campos petroleros del sur, que habían representado las tres cuartas partes de la producción de petróleo del país.

Abril de 2015: Al-Bashir gana otro mandato de cinco años en una votación empañada por la baja participación.

Noviembre-diciembre de 2016 - Cientos de manifestantes toman las calles contra la decisión del gobierno de recortar los subsidios a los combustibles, como lo exige el Fondo Monetario Internacional.

Octubre de 2017: Estados Unidos anuncia el levantamiento parcial de las sanciones de larga data contra Sudán, citando el progreso de Jartum en la lucha contra el terrorismo y su compromiso de no perseguir acuerdos de armas con Corea del Norte.

Enero de 2018: estallan protestas en todo Sudán contra los aumentos de precios causados ​​por las medidas de austeridad del gobierno.

Agosto de 2018: el gobernante Partido del Congreso Nacional de Sudán dice que respaldaría a al-Bashir como su candidato en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020.

16 de diciembre de 2018: Al-Bashir se convierte en el primer líder de la Liga Árabe en visitar Siria desde que estalló la guerra civil allí hace casi ocho años. Es recibido en el aeropuerto de Damasco por el presidente sirio Bashar Assad.

19 de diciembre de 2018: estallan manifestaciones antigubernamentales en todo Sudán, inicialmente debido a fuertes subidas de precios y escasez, pero pronto cambian a llamamientos para que al-Bashir renuncie. Las fuerzas de seguridad responden con una feroz represión que mata a decenas.

19 de febrero de 2019: Al-Bashir declara el estado de emergencia, prohíbe todas las reuniones no autorizadas y otorga a las fuerzas de seguridad amplios poderes para sofocar las protestas.

6 de abril: comienza una gran sentada frente al cuartel general del ejército en Jartum. Durante los próximos cinco días, las fuerzas de seguridad mataron a 22 personas en un intento por despejar la sentada. Las protestas cobran impulso después de la renuncia a principios de semana del presidente de Argelia, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, en el poder durante 20 años, en respuesta a manifestaciones similares.

11 de abril: el ejército sudanés arresta a al-Bashir y dice que se hará cargo durante los próximos 2 años, suspendiendo la constitución del país y cerrando sus fronteras y espacio aéreo. También se impone un estado de emergencia de tres meses.

12 de abril: el general Abdel-Fattah Burhan reemplaza al líder golpista vinculado al derramamiento de sangre en Darfur, Awad Mohammed Ibn Ouf, después de manifestaciones callejeras en su contra.

17 de abril - Funcionarios sudaneses dicen que al-Bashir ha sido trasladado a una prisión en Jartum.

21 de abril: los organizadores de la protesta suspenden las conversaciones con el consejo militar gobernante, diciendo que no ha cumplido con sus demandas de una transferencia inmediata a un gobierno civil.

25 de abril: bajo la presión de las crecientes protestas, tres miembros del consejo militar gobernante dimiten.

27 de abril: los líderes de la protesta reanudan las conversaciones con el consejo militar gobernante.

13 de mayo: los fiscales sudaneses dicen que han acusado a al-Bashir de participar en el asesinato y de incitar a matar a los manifestantes durante el levantamiento.

14 de mayo: los manifestantes dicen que agentes de seguridad leales al líder derrocado al-Bashir atacaron sus sentadas durante la noche, lo que desencadenó enfrentamientos que mataron a cinco personas, incluido un oficial del ejército.

15 de mayo: los líderes del ejército y de la oposición anuncian un progreso significativo en las negociaciones, un período de transición de tres años, un gabinete y la composición de un cuerpo legislativo de transición de 300 miembros, totalmente civil.

25 de mayo: miles de islamistas, aliados durante mucho tiempo con el régimen de al-Bashir, se manifiestan para apoyar el gobierno islámico respaldado por los militares en Jartum.

28 de mayo: los líderes de la protesta lanzan una huelga general de dos días para presionar al ejército para que entregue el poder a una autoridad liderada por civiles.

3 de junio: los líderes de la protesta dicen que las fuerzas de seguridad atacan su plantón en Jartum en el centro del movimiento, abriendo fuego, incendiando tiendas de campaña y matando a más de 30 personas.


Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiry - 1969-1985

Gaafar Muhammad an-Nimeiry (también conocido como Ga'far Muhammad Numayri, Jaafar Nimeiry, Dzafar Nimeiri, Gaafar Nimeiry o formaciones similares) fue un coronel del ejército que se apoderó de Sudán en un golpe de Estado de 1969 y, al seguir un curso político en constante desviación, mantuvo pasó a la presidencia hasta que un golpe incruento lo derrocó en 1985. Demostró ser un dictador hábil, sobreviviendo a numerosos golpes, intrigando constantemente con las fuerzas políticas, construyendo pretensiones de gobierno mediante el consentimiento a través de instituciones políticas novedosas (la Unión Socialista Sudanesa de partido único).

El 25 de mayo de 1969, varios oficiales jóvenes, autodenominados Movimiento de Oficiales Libres, tomaron el poder. En el núcleo de la conspiración había nueve oficiales dirigidos por el coronel Jaafar an Nimeiri, que había estado implicado en complots contra el régimen de Abbud. El golpe de Nimeiri se adelantó a los complots de otros grupos, la mayoría de los cuales involucraban a facciones del ejército apoyadas por el SCP, nacionalistas árabes o grupos religiosos conservadores. Justificó el golpe sobre la base de que los políticos civiles habían paralizado el proceso de toma de decisiones, no habían abordado los problemas económicos y regionales del país y habían dejado al Sudán sin una constitución permanente.

Los líderes golpistas, junto con Awadallah, el ex presidente del Tribunal Supremo que había estado al tanto del golpe, se constituyeron en el Consejo de Comando Revolucionario (CCR) de diez miembros, que poseía la autoridad ejecutiva colectiva bajo la presidencia de Nimeiri. Al asumir el control, la ICR proclamó el establecimiento de una "república democrática" dedicada a promover el "socialismo sudanés" independiente. Los primeros actos de la ICR incluyeron la suspensión de la Constitución de Transición, la abolición de todas las instituciones gubernamentales y la prohibición de los partidos políticos. La RCC también nacionalizó muchas industrias, empresas y bancos. Además, Nimeiri ordenó el arresto de sesenta y tres políticos civiles y los oficiales superiores del ejército retirados por la fuerza.

Awadallah, nombrado primer ministro para formar un nuevo gobierno para implementar las directivas políticas de la ICR, quería disipar la idea de que el golpe había instalado una dictadura militar. Presidió un gabinete de veintiún miembros que incluía solo a tres funcionarios de la RCC, entre ellos su presidente, Nimeiri, quien también era ministro de Defensa. Los otros miembros militares del gabinete tenían las carteras de seguridad interna y comunicaciones. Nueve miembros del régimen de Awadallah eran supuestamente comunistas, incluido uno de los dos sureños en el gabinete, John Garang, ministro de Abastecimiento y más tarde ministro de Asuntos del Sur. Otros se identificaron como marxistas. Dado que la ICR carecía de experiencia política y administrativa, los comunistas desempeñaron un papel importante en la configuración de las políticas y programas gubernamentales. A pesar de la influencia de los miembros individuales del SCP, la ICR afirmó que su cooperación con el partido era una cuestión de conveniencia.

En noviembre de 1969, después de afirmar que el régimen no podría sobrevivir sin la ayuda comunista, Awadallah perdió el cargo de primer ministro. Nimeiri, quien se convirtió en jefe de un gobierno mayoritariamente civil además de jefe de estado, lo sucedió. Awadallah mantuvo su cargo de vicepresidente de la RCC y permaneció en el gobierno como ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y como un vínculo importante con elementos de izquierda.

Las fuerzas conservadoras, lideradas por Ansar, representaban la mayor amenaza para la RCC. El imán Al Hadi al Mahdi se había retirado a su bastión en la isla de Aba (en el Nilo, cerca de Jartum) creyendo que el gobierno había decidido atacar al movimiento Ansar. El imán había exigido el regreso al gobierno democrático, la exclusión de los comunistas del poder y el fin del gobierno de la RCC. En marzo de 1970, multitudes hostiles de Ansar impidieron que Nimeiri visitara la isla para conversar con el imán. Posteriormente, estalló la lucha entre las fuerzas gubernamentales y hasta 30.000 Ansar. Cuando los Ansar ignoraron un ultimátum para rendirse, las unidades del ejército con apoyo aéreo asaltaron la isla de Aba. Aproximadamente 3.000 personas murieron durante la batalla. El imán escapó solo para ser asesinado mientras intentaba cruzar la frontera hacia Etiopía. El gobierno exilió a Sadiq al Mahdi a Egipto, donde Nasser prometió mantenerlo bajo vigilancia para evitar que sucediera a su tío como jefe del movimiento Ansar.

Después de neutralizar a esta oposición conservadora, la ICR se concentró en consolidar su organización política para eliminar gradualmente la participación comunista en el gobierno. Esta estrategia generó un debate interno dentro del SCP. El ala ortodoxa, encabezada por el secretario general del partido, Abd al Khaliq Mahjub, exigió un gobierno de frente popular con la participación de los comunistas como socios iguales. El ala Nacional Comunista, por otro lado, apoyó la cooperación con el gobierno.

Poco después de que el ejército aplastara a los Ansar en la isla Aba, Nimeiri se movió contra el SCP. Ordenó la deportación de Abd al Khaliq Mahjub. Luego, cuando el secretario general del SCP regresó ilegalmente a Sudán después de varios meses en el extranjero, Nimeiri lo puso bajo arresto domiciliario. En marzo de 1971, Nimeiri indicó que los sindicatos, un bastión comunista tradicional, quedarían bajo el control del gobierno. La RCC también prohibió las organizaciones de estudiantes, mujeres y profesionales afiliadas a la comunidad. Además, Nimeiri anunció la formación prevista de un movimiento político nacional llamado Unión Socialista de Sudán (SSU), que asumiría el control de todos los partidos políticos, incluido el SCP. Después de este discurso, el gobierno arrestó al comité central del SCP y a otros líderes comunistas.

El SCP, sin embargo, retuvo una organización encubierta que no resultó dañada en el barrido. Antes de que pudieran tomarse más medidas contra el partido, el SCP lanzó un golpe de estado contra Nimeiri. El golpe se produjo el 19 de julio de 1971, cuando uno de los conspiradores, el mayor Hisham al Atta, sorprendió a Nimeiri y a la RCC reunida en el palacio presidencial y los apresó junto con varios oficiales proNimeiri. Atta nombró un consejo revolucionario de siete miembros, en el que los comunistas ocupaban un lugar destacado, para que sirviera como gobierno nacional. Sin embargo, tres días después del golpe, unidades leales del ejército asaltaron el palacio, rescataron a Nimeiri y arrestaron a Atta y sus aliados. Nimeiri, quien culpó al SCP por el golpe, ordenó el arresto de cientos de militares comunistas y disidentes. Posteriormente, el gobierno ejecutó a algunas de estas personas y encarceló a muchas otras.

Habiendo sobrevivido al golpe inspirado por SCP, Nimeiri reafirmó su compromiso de establecer un estado socialista. Una constitución provisional, publicada en agosto de 1971, describió a Sudán como una "democracia socialista" y estableció una forma de gobierno presidencial para reemplazar a la ICR. Un plebiscito el mes siguiente eligió a Nimeiri para un mandato de seis años como presidente.

A pesar de sus problemas políticos, Nimeiri mantuvo su compromiso de poner fin a la insurgencia del sur. Creía que podía detener los combates y estabilizar la región otorgando autogobierno regional y emprendiendo el desarrollo económico en el sur. Las dos partes firmaron los acuerdos de Addis Abeba el 27 de marzo de 1972, que a partir de entonces se celebró como el Día de la Unidad Nacional. Los acuerdos de Addis Abeba garantizan la autonomía de una región del sur.

Después del asentamiento en el sur, Nimeiri intentó enmendar las relaciones con los grupos religiosos musulmanes del norte. El gobierno emprendió una descentralización administrativa, popular entre los Ansar, que favoreció las áreas rurales sobre las urbanas, donde el activismo de izquierda era más evidente. Jartum también reafirmó la posición especial del Islam en el país, reconoció la sharia como la fuente de toda la legislación y liberó a algunos miembros de órdenes religiosas que habían sido encarcelados. Sin embargo, una reconciliación con grupos conservadores, que se habían organizado fuera de Sudán bajo el liderazgo de Sadiq al Mahdi y más tarde fueron conocidos como el Frente Nacional, eludió a Nimeiri.

En agosto de 1972, Nimeiri buscó consolidar su posición creando una Asamblea Constituyente para redactar una constitución permanente. Luego pidió la renuncia del gobierno que le permitiera nombrar un gabinete cuyos miembros provenían de la Asamblea Constituyente. Nimeiri excluyó a las personas que se habían opuesto al asentamiento del sur o que habían sido identificadas con la facción pro-egipcia de la SSU.

En mayo de 1973, la Asamblea Constituyente promulgó un proyecto de constitución. Este documento preveía la continuación del gobierno presidencial, reconocía a la SSU como la única organización política autorizada y apoyaba la autonomía regional para el sur. La constitución también estipulaba que los votantes debían elegir a los miembros de la Asamblea Popular de 250 escaños de una lista aprobada por la SSU. Aunque citaba al Islam como religión oficial de Sudán, la constitución admitía el cristianismo como la fe de un gran número de ciudadanos sudaneses (ver Cristianismo, cap. 2). En mayo de 1974, los votantes seleccionaron a 125 miembros para los grupos ocupacionales y profesionales afiliados a la asamblea, nombrados 100 y el presidente nombró a los 25 restantes.

El descontento con las políticas de Nimeiri y el creciente papel militar en el gobierno se intensificó como resultado de la escasez de alimentos y el asentamiento del sur, que muchos conservadores musulmanes consideraron una rendición. En 1973 y 1974 hubo intentos fallidos de golpe contra Nimeiri. Los musulmanes y los estudiantes de izquierda también organizaron huelgas contra el gobierno. En septiembre de 1974, Nimeiri respondió a este malestar declarando el estado de emergencia, purgando la SSU y arrestando a un gran número de disidentes. Nimeiri también reemplazó a algunos miembros del gabinete con personal militar leal a él.

La oposición conservadora a Nimeiri se fusionó en el Frente Nacional, formado en 1974. El Frente Nacional incluía a personas del ala Sadiq de Umma, la NUP y el Frente de la Carta Islámica, entonces brazo político de los Hermanos Musulmanes, un movimiento activista islámico. Su actividad cristalizó en un intento de golpe de estado inspirado en Ansar en julio de 1976. Los soldados del gobierno restauraron rápidamente el orden al matar a más de 700 rebeldes en Jartum y arrestar a decenas de disidentes, incluidos muchos líderes religiosos prominentes. A pesar de este malestar, en 1977 los votantes sudaneses reelegieron a Nimeiri para un segundo mandato de seis años como presidente.

Tras el intento de golpe de 1976, Nimeiri y sus oponentes adoptaron políticas más conciliadoras. A principios de 1977, funcionarios del gobierno se reunieron con el Frente Nacional en Londres y organizaron una conferencia entre Nimeiri y Sadiq al Mahdi en Port Sudan. En lo que se conoció como la "reconciliación nacional", los dos mandatarios firmaron un acuerdo de ocho puntos que readmitía a la oposición a la vida nacional a cambio de la disolución del Frente Nacional. El acuerdo también restauró las libertades civiles, liberó a los presos políticos, reafirmó la política exterior no alineada de Sudán y prometió reformar el gobierno local. Como resultado de la reconciliación, el gobierno liberó a unos 1.000 detenidos y concedió una amnistía a Sadiq al Mahdi. La SSU también admitió en sus filas a ex simpatizantes del Frente Nacional. Sadiq renunció a la política multipartidista e instó a sus seguidores a trabajar dentro del sistema de partido único del régimen.

La primera prueba de reconciliación nacional ocurrió durante las elecciones a la Asamblea Popular de febrero de 1978. Nimeiri autorizó a los exiliados que regresaban asociados con el antiguo Partido Umma, el DUP y los Hermanos Musulmanes a presentarse a las elecciones como candidatos independientes. Estos independientes obtuvieron 140 de 304 escaños, lo que llevó a muchos observadores a aplaudir los esfuerzos de Nimeiri por democratizar el sistema político de Sudán. Sin embargo, las elecciones a la Asamblea Popular marcaron el comienzo de un mayor declive político. El hecho de que la SSU no patrocinara a los candidatos oficiales debilitó la disciplina del partido y llevó a muchos diputados a la asamblea, que también eran miembros de la SSU, a afirmar que el partido los había traicionado. Como resultado, un número cada vez mayor de diputados de la asamblea utilizó sus oficinas para promover intereses personales más que nacionales.

El fin del monopolio político de la SSU, junto con la corrupción desenfrenada en todos los niveles de gobierno, arroja cada vez más dudas sobre la capacidad de Nimeiri para gobernar Sudán. Para preservar su régimen, Nimeiri adoptó un estilo de liderazgo más dictatorial. Ordenó a la Organización de Seguridad del Estado encarcelar sin juicio a miles de opositores y disidentes. Nimeiri también destituyó o transfirió a cualquier ministro o oficial militar superior que pareciera estar desarrollando su propia base de poder. Nimeiri seleccionó reemplazos basándose en su lealtad hacia él más que en sus habilidades. Esta estrategia hizo que el presidente perdiera contacto con el sentimiento popular y la situación política del país se deterioró.

El 5 de junio de 1983, Nimeiri trató de contrarrestar el creciente poder político del sur dividiendo la Región Sur en las tres antiguas provincias de Bahr al Ghazal, Al Istiwai y Aali an Nil había suspendido la Asamblea Regional del Sur casi dos años antes. El Movimiento de Liberación del Pueblo Sudanés (SPLM) con sede en el sur y su ala militar, el Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo Sudanés (SPLA), que surgió a mediados de 1983, se opusieron sin éxito a esta redivisión y pidieron la creación de un nuevo Sudán unido.

A los pocos meses, en septiembre de 1983, Nimeiri proclamó la sharia como la base del sistema legal sudanés. Los decretos de Nimeiri, que se conocieron como las Leyes de Septiembre, fueron resentidos amargamente tanto por los musulmanes secularizados como por los sureños predominantemente no musulmanes. El SPLM denunció la sharia y las ejecuciones y amputaciones ordenadas por tribunales religiosos. Mientras tanto, la situación de seguridad en el sur se había deteriorado tanto que a fines de 1983 equivalía a la reanudación de la guerra civil.

A principios de 1985, el descontento antigubernamental resultó en una huelga general en Jartum. Los manifestantes se opusieron al aumento de los costos de los alimentos, la gasolina y el transporte. La huelga general paralizó el país. Nimeiri, que estaba de visita en Estados Unidos, no pudo reprimir las manifestaciones que crecían rápidamente contra su régimen. La combinación de la redivisión del sur, la introducción en todo el país de la sharia, la reanudación de la guerra civil y los crecientes problemas económicos contribuyeron finalmente a la caída de Nimeiri. El 6 de abril de 1985, un grupo de oficiales militares, encabezados por el teniente general Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab, derrocó a Nimeiri, quien se refugió en Egipto.

Gaafar al-Nimeiry murió en Sudán el 30 de mayo. Tenía 79 años. La muerte fue anunciada por SUNA, la agencia estatal de noticias, que no dio una causa.


Gaafar al-Nimeiry, un líder de Sudán con una política cambiante, muere a los 79 años

Gaafar al-Nimeiry, un coronel del ejército que se apoderó de Sudán en un golpe de Estado en 1969 y, al seguir un curso político en constante desviación, se mantuvo en la presidencia hasta que un golpe incruenta lo derrocó en 1985, murió en Sudán el 30 de mayo. Tenía 79 años. .

La muerte fue anunciada por SUNA, la agencia estatal de noticias, que no dio una causa.

En su mandato de 16 años, el presidente Nimeiry pasó del ardiente nacionalismo árabe al socialismo, de las relaciones amistosas con la Unión Soviética a una postura pro-occidental y una estrecha alianza con Estados Unidos. Aunque a menudo se le consideraba uno de los líderes árabes más moderados, no era reacio a las violentas represiones e incluso a las ejecuciones masivas de opositores. Sobrevivió a cuatro intentos de golpe en sus primeros nueve años en el poder.

El coronel Nimeiry dirigió un pequeño grupo, que se hacía llamar Oficiales Libres, que tomó el poder el 25 de mayo de 1969. Su causa, dijeron, era el nacionalismo árabe y el socialismo revolucionario inspirado en la ideología del presidente Gamal Abdel Nasser de Egipto. En el momento del golpe, la región sur de Sudán, hogar de cristianos negros y animistas que se sentían oprimidos por el gobierno dominado por musulmanes, había estado plagada de rebeliones durante 14 años.

Paso a paso durante los siguientes ocho años, el presidente Nimeiry intentó unir a los diversos elementos de su país: los cristianos y animistas del sur, los musulmanes de línea dura y los comunistas acérrimos. Se encontró con la resistencia de los extremistas de izquierda y derecha.

En 1971, el Sr. Nimeiry sobrevivió a un golpe instigado por los comunistas durante el cual fue encarcelado durante tres días. Escapó saltando por una ventana cuando llegaron las fuerzas leales. Después de ese intento de golpe, comenzó a alejar a Sudán de la influencia soviética y acercarlo a una alianza con gobiernos árabes conservadores como Egipto y Arabia Saudita. Su gobierno también se volvió más pro-occidental y comenzó a recibir armamento de los Estados Unidos.

Luego, en marzo de 1972, firmó un acuerdo de paz con los rebeldes del sur, otorgando autonomía regional a las provincias del sur. Sus esfuerzos de unificación fueron elogiados en Occidente. Fue el único líder árabe que apoyó al presidente Anwar el-Sadat de Egipto después de que Sadat firmara los acuerdos de paz de Camp David con Israel en 1978.

Para entonces, Estados Unidos veía al Sr. Nimeiry como un contrapeso al gobierno marxista en Etiopía, en la frontera oriental de Sudán, y al gobierno hostil del coronel Muammar el-Qaddafi en Libia, al noroeste. En 1976, durante un intento de golpe de Estado respaldado por Libia, el presidente Nimeiry evitó la captura cuando su avión que llegaba de Europa aterrizó antes de lo previsto debido a un viento de cola. Cuando 98 personas implicadas en el complot fueron ejecutadas, Nimeiry generó críticas en todo el mundo.

Se volvió cada vez más dictatorial. En 1983, buscando el apoyo de los extremistas musulmanes, impuso la ley islámica en todo Sudán. En violación del acuerdo de paz de 1972 con los rebeldes, disolvió el gobierno regional del sur. Eso reavivó un conflicto que continúa hasta el día de hoy.

El alza de los precios de los alimentos y el combustible dio lugar a manifestaciones masivas y una huelga general en 1985, lo que llevó al ejército de Sudán a derrocar al Sr. Nimeiry. Permaneció exiliado en Egipto durante 14 años. En 1999, el presidente Omar Hassan al-Bashir le permitió regresar a Sudán.

Gaafar Mohammed al-Nimeiry nació el 1 de enero de 1930 en Omdurman, frente a Jartum, a orillas del Nilo, cuando su país aún estaba bajo el dominio conjunto de Gran Bretaña y Egipto. (Se independizó en 1956). Su padre era mensajero de una empresa británica. Le sobrevive su esposa, según la agencia de noticias estatal sudanesa.

La biografía oficial de Nimeiry dice que fue rebelde incluso cuando era adolescente: cuando Gran Bretaña retrasó la concesión de la autodeterminación a Sudán, encabezó una huelga que mantuvo cerrada su escuela secundaria durante siete meses.


Nimeiri derrocado en Sudán - Historia

En África, la caída de un tirano no siempre presagia mejores tiempos. Han ocurrido cosas peores en Uganda desde el derrocamiento de Idi Amin, peor que bajo su régimen. En Etiopía, la autocracia imperial fue reemplazada por una dictadura militar que ha demostrado ser igualmente represiva y mucho más sangrienta. En países donde la vida política ha sido sofocada, el liderazgo tradicional socavado y la gente educada aniquilada o llevada al exilio, puede que no haya los medios para establecer un gobierno representativo de ningún tipo.

Pero este no es el caso en Sudán. Hay demasiadas personas esperando formar un gobierno. Los dieciséis años en el poder del presidente Nimeiri se caracterizaron más por la confusión política y la mala gestión económica que por la represión total. Las ejecuciones y amputaciones de los últimos dos años fueron la última estratagema de un demente Maquiavelo que pensó, tal vez, que podría salvaguardar tanto su alma como su poder mundano jugando la carta islámica.

Si Nimeiri pensó que podía conseguir el apoyo popular por este medio, estaba equivocado. Sudán no es Irán. Aunque muchos de sus habitantes son musulmanes, en su mayoría siguen formas de sufismo. Y a muchos de ellos les gusta beber alcohol. La religión del Libro está impregnada de las cosmologías tribales que la precedieron. A los líderes de las facciones islámicas les molestaba que Nimeiri se arrogara a sí mismo la autoridad religiosa. Aquellos profesionales para quienes el Islam no es una cuestión de convicciones apasionadas quedaron consternados por su intento de desviar la atención de la crisis económica y política del país. Antiguos partidarios de Nimeiri comenzaron a expresar su oposición. En libros elocuentes publicados en Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos, su ex Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Mansour Khalid, y el Ministro de Cultura e Información, Bona Malwal, declararon su indignación por la espiral de Nimeiri hacia la religiosidad y la represión.

Las multitudes que salieron a las calles para celebrar su caída, bailando en éxtasis donde unos días antes habían sido lanzados con gases lacrimógenos por la policía de seguridad, injuriaron a Nimeiri, pidiendo su ejecución y gritando '¡Regreso Octubre!' - una referencia al golpe de estado. en octubre de 1964 que derrocó al último dictador de Sudán, el general Abboud, y marcó el comienzo de un breve período de gobierno civil. Bañaron a los policías con pétalos de buganvillas y rompieron billetes con la imagen del expresidente.

No hay duda de que fue un golpe popular. The inhabitants of greater Khartoum came in from the New Extension to join the demonstrations, from Omdurman, across the Nile bridges, and from the low mud houses that proliferate on the outskirts of the city, where the desert begins. On Radio Omdurman, the commander-in-chief of the Army announced that he had seized power in the name of the people. He would return it to them, he said, within six months. On another waveband Nimeiri’s old enemy Colonel Gaddafi, who has aspired frequently, but without success, to intervene in his neighbour’s affairs, harangued the citizens of the Sudan from Tripoli. “The hour of salvation has struck,” he said.

Bandage your wounds. When you triumph, a new dawn will emerge over Sudan and the Arab nation. Darkness will descend on the capitals of the enemies. Tomorrow when you triumph we will turn Sudan into a wheat farm … Tomorrow we will turn the waters of the Nile into gold …

Shifting alliances

Bougainvillea is a tough shrub, bright and profuse. It needs little water to blossom. This is just as well, for it is the height of the dry season in the Northern Sudan and the country is experiencing its most severe drought for decades. The waters of the Nile are too valuable to be turned into gold, unless it is the gold of granaries. In the western province of Darfur, towards Chad, famine is driving pastoralists southwards, to the grazing lands of the Dinka, the largest of the peoples of the Southern region, much of which has been in revolt against the government in Khartoum for the last two years. In the north-east the famine which has decimated Eritrea and Tigray is spreading, exacerbated by refugees fleeing from their homes in Ethiopia.

Sudan has a harsh climate at the best of times. Its civic life has flowered with little encouragement from nature. The charm and dignity of ordinary Sudanese is a triumph over adversity. But the present crisis is the greatest they have faced since independence. Tearing up banknotes may seem a wanton gesture, but Sudanese currency has already been vandalised. Prices of basic commodities have escalated to the point where in parts of the country a sack of dura, the staple cereal, costs four hundred Sudanese pounds. All the money in the country could hardly pay the interest on its nine billion dollar foreign debt. Sudan is virtually bankrupt, its economic institutions in chaos, its populace demoralised and close to starvation. If the spectre of destitution could be banished by destroying paper money it would be a cheap price to pay. Nimeiri came to embody Sudan’s malaise in the same way as many another autocrat. By identifying with, then discrediting, one faction or interest group after another for 16 years, he was left, finally, with no one to blame.

In 1969 he took power in a Communist-backed military coup against the governing Umma Party. The Umma Party is the political arm of the Ansar, second largest of the Northern political-religious groupings, which, in an earlier incarnation, under the Mahdi, ruled the Sudan in the 1890s. In 1970 the Ansar withdrew their support from Nimeiri’s coalition and were attacked at their shrine on Aba island in the Nile. In 1971 Nimeiri turned on the Communists. In 1972 he obtained the support of the Southerners with the Addis Ababa Agreement, which ended the civil war and gave the South some regional autonomy. In 1975 a coup attempt that was supported both by the Ansar and by some elements of the Khatmiyya, Sudan’s other main traditional political-religious formation, was defeated. In 1976, a Libyan-backed insurrection narrowly failed to seize power in Khartoum. In 1977 Nimeiri announced a National Reconciliation with Saddiq-el-Mahdi, the Ansar leader. By 1980 this had broken down.

Then, in the 1980s, Nimeiri moved towards the Muslim Brothers, a small grouping of hard-line Islamic fundamentalists. In 1982, pursuing a divide-and-rule policy, he dissolved the Southern Regional Assembly and abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement, precipitating a renewal of armed resistance in the south of the country. In 1983 he announced the imposition of sharia law, which further alienated the non-Muslim Southerners, previously Nimeiri’s staunchest supporters and by the following year half the South was outside government control. In 1985 Nimeiri turned on the Muslim Brothers they were accused of plotting a coup and their leaders imprisoned. His last move before the coup was to rehabilitate the original members of the Revolutionary Council that had been established in 1969. But by now even the Army, which brought him to power, had turned against him, and the threat of mutiny forced General Sowar el Dahab, appointed Defence Minister only a few weeks before, on the eve of Nimeiri’s visit to the United States, to take over.

Obstacles to good government

Soldiers who announce an imminent return to democracy are not to be trusted. But it does seem probable that some form of civilian government will be installed in Khartoum in the near future. The question is, what kind? What kind of government can cope with the terrible problems of this great tract of land? Nimeiri’s legacy of political confusion will make it hard for any administration to vest itself with sufficient authority to effect the draconian measures required to put the country’s economy in order.

If the people of the Sudan—or Khartoum—really want a return to the 1960s, to the spirit of October 1964, they may be misguided. In the brief period of democracy between 1965 and 1969, when Nimeiri took power, political life was characterised by endless squabbling between the Northern parties, a repressive attitude towards the non-Muslim South, and a consequent intensification of the North-South civil war that began =after independence in 1956. There is a real danger that the same thing will happen again. The country is at war with itself once more. The political parties, banned by Nimeiri, have little more experience of government than they did twenty years ago. The problems of governing are greater. The enormous distances, the ethnic diversity, the lack of proper roads, functioning railways or passable waterways—all these are a severe handicap to central government. It is a case of administration without communication.

Sudan is a graveyard of development projects: the Gezira, established under the colonial administration, where cotton production has been declining year by year the Kenana Sugar Project, Lonrho’s big rock candy mountain, initiated in 1970, never completed the Jonglei Canal, a controversial irrigation scheme that was to cut through the Southern swamps providing water for irrigation and an all-weather road linking North and South, which was halted by the civil war. Sudan needs such things, not just to lift itself out of penury, but to give it a sense of nationhood. Not that nationalism is lacking, but it is that of factions, tribal, religious or military.

The squabbling of the Northern factions is one thing. The profound divide between North and South is another. This is not simply a religious and ethnic difference, as, say, in Nigeria. It is a legacy of the slave trade. Northerners tend to blame the colonial administration, which kept the Arabs out of the South, and made few efforts to promote economic development there. But the Northern record in the Southern region since independence has consisted almost entirely of economic exploitation by merchants from the north, central government being represented by an intermittently oppressive military presence. There is animosity between Southerners and Northerners, rooted in historical experience, and the present rebellion is fuelled by this as much as by political grievances.

Just as hatred of Nimeiri was able to unite the interests of Northern and Southern Sudanese, it is distrust of the North which keeps the South together. In ethnographic literature a similar phenomenon is known as segmentary opposition: brothers may fight but they unite to feud with their cousins. Clans feud with clans, but fight together against other tribes. Ill-feeling between the main ethnic blocs in the South, the cattle herders of the savannah belt and the sedentary agriculturalists of the equatorial region, was exploited by Nimeiri after 1982 to divide Southerners as he had divided the Northerners. It did not work for long they soon identified the common enemy. Nevertheless the rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, is a predominantly Nilotic movement and it is in the areas occupied by speakers of Nilote languages—Dinka and Nuer—that it has prevailed. This territorial base, a band across the middle of the South, has enabled it to cut internal communications with Khartoum, but limits its supply lines to Ethiopia, not the best foreign ally for a rebel movement.

Perhaps for this reason, perhaps from sincerely held political conviction, the SPLA, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement, unlike its equivalent in the first civil war, has never been a separatist movement. Its leader, John Garang, an American-educated Dinka from Bor, is a soldier, but his stated aim has always been the installation of constitutional democracy in the Sudan as a whole. Once again it seems that all military men really want is democracy. The SPLA can take some credit for the demoralisation of the Northern Army and the consequent removal of Nimeiri. The South, indeed, can always make Sudan ungovernable: it has contributed to the demise of every government since independence. It can topple regimes in Khartoum and, on occasion, maintain them in power. But it cannot install a government. Any accord the SPLA makes with the new rulers of Sudan will require firm guarantees of Southern autonomy. Men of good will in the North know this: they also know that most Northerners are not even aware of Southern aspirations to civic equality.

It is possible that Northern politicians are banking on an accord with the regime in Addis that would end Ethiopian support for the Southern rebels. This would not end the fighting, though. There are enough guns in the South to turn it into Chad or Uganda overnight. In the absence of a clearly identifiable enemy, support among Southerners for the SPLA could become a matter of tribal loyalty, though this would be in contrast to the first civil war, where segmentary opposition prevailed and Zande and Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk fought side by side against Arabs. Certainly, now that Nimeiri has gone the SPLA has less leverage in Khartoum. And as he showed, the policy of divide and rule can be pitted against the principle of segmentary opposition. In the worst event a Northern administration might be able to live with mayhem in the South. It has happened before, after all. But this is to reckon without oil.

Oil, water and the future

Most of Sudan’s recently-discovered oil is in the Southern swamps. The rigs have lain rusting since the SPLA attacked them two years ago, along with the gigantic earthmover that was used to construct the Jonglei Canal. Oil cannot solve a nation’s economic problems—this is something we know all too well. But the promise of wealth is political capita. This is something Nimeiri knew, to the extent of attempting to redraw the boundaries of the Southern region to relocate the oilfields in the North. The fertile South, once seen by the North as a milch cow, is now its petrol pump. Or could be, if the fighting stopped.

Although a Northern government might survive without making peace with the Southerners, the South remains the key to development, without which any Northern government will be permanently unstable. It is not just oil: the South has the water too. The Jonglei scheme, which envisaged a 300-kilometre-long canal cutting through the swamps, increasing the flow of the Nile to the North by 50 per cent, was designed primarily, not for the sake of communications in the South, nor even irrigation schemes in the North, but to slake the thirst of Egypt, whose dependence on the Nile waters has led it to keep a jealous eye on the land beyond the cataracts ever since antiquity.

Such geopolitical and hydropolitical considerations will determine the future history of the Sudan. What the country needs now is a government composed of those who can use these constraints as opportunities—opportunities to balance the traditional hostilities between ethnic groups, and establish a political system where interest groups are fairly represented without recourse to armed opposition. It is a tall order, but the Sudan is not without resources of political good will, either among its own people, or in the outside world. ★


A timeline of key events in Sudan's unfinished revolution

CAIRO (AP) — Sudan's security forces violently dispersed on Monday the camp at the center of the protest movement that in April forced the army to remove Sudan's strongman, Omar al-Bashir, after 30 years of rule — and then stayed in the streets to keep up pressure on the generals who took his place.

For months, tens of thousands in the camp and other protest sites have been demanding a speedy transition to civilian rule. The break-up of the sit-in threatens to escalate the struggle between the protesters and the army to a new, more volatile level.

Many protest leaders see the confrontation with the army as part of the struggle to purge the state's institutions of al-Bashir's army and Islamist supporters. The autocrat's time in power will likely be remembered as among the most oppressive in Sudan's modern history.

Here is a timeline of key events in the rise and fall of al-Bashir, and Sudan's unfinished revolution:

1980s — A career army officer, al-Bashir assumes a leading role in the war against rebels in the south.

1985 — Sudanese army overthrows former President Jaafar al-Nimeiri in a bloodless coup. The army quickly hands power to an elected government, which proves dysfunctional and only rules for a few years.

1989 — Leading an alliance of the army and Islamist hard-liners, al-Bashir stages a coup against Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, dissolving the government and all political parties. He appoints himself chair of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, which rules the country, and is named defense minister.

1990 — Coup attempt fails to unseat al-Bashir.

1991 — Al-Bashir and his Islamist allies impose Islamic or Sharia law, fueling the division between the country's Muslim, Arabized north and the mainly animist and Christian south.

August 1993 — U.S. State Department lists Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism.

October 1993 — Al-Bashir is appointed president.

1996 — Al-Bashir is re-elected president.

1997 — U.S. imposes sanctions against Sudan's government, accusing it of supporting terrorism.

June 1998 — Sudanese legislators draft a new constitution that lifts the ban on political parties.

December — Al-Bashir dissolves the parliament after an Islamist political ally proposes laws limiting the president's powers.

2000 — Al-Bashir wins another presidential election with over 85% of the vote.

2003 — Rebel groups in Darfur attack the government in an uprising against alleged abuses and mistreatment by authorities. Al-Bashir seeks help from the Janjaweed militias, whose brutal tactics terrorize people in the region and displace more than 2 million people. A small peacekeeping force from the African Union arrives.

2005 — Under international pressure, a peace deal is reached between al-Bashir and the southern Sudanese rebel group, the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The agreement gives southern Sudanese the right to determine whether the south would remain part of Sudan.

July 2008 — International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor calls for an arrest warrant against al-Bashir, citing charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in Darfur. The Sudanese government, which is not a party to the treaty creating the ICC, denies the accusations and proclaims al-Bashir's innocence.

March 2009 — The ICC issues an arrest warrant for al-Bashir — the first time that the ICC seeks the arrest of a sitting head of state — charging him with war crimes and crimes against humanity but not genocide. Later, a second arrest warrant is issued against al-Bashir, this time with a genocide charge.

April 2010 — Al-Bashir is re-elected with about 68% of vote in the country's first multiparty elections in more than 20 years. Two main opposition rivals withdraw over alleged fraudulent practices.

July 2011 — South Sudan gains independence after a referendum in January. South Sudan's independence causes economic difficulties in Sudan as the new country gains control over the southern oil fields, which had accounted for three-quarters of the country's oil production.

April 2015 — Al-Bashir wins another five-year term in a vote marred by low turnout.

November-December 2016 — Hundreds of protesters take to streets against a government decision to slash fuel subsidies, as required by the International Monetary Fund.

October 2017 — U.S. announces partial lifting of long-standing sanctions against Sudan, citing progress by Khartoum in fighting terrorism and its commitment not to pursue arms deals with North Korea.

January 2018 — Protests break out across Sudan against price hikes caused by government austerity measures.

August 2018 — Sudan's ruling National Congress Party says it would back al-Bashir as its candidate in the 2020 presidential election.

Dec. 16, 2018 — Al-Bashir becomes the first Arab League leader to visit Syria since civil war erupted there nearly eight years ago. He is greeted at the Damascus airport by Syrian President Bashar Assad.

Dec. 19, 2018 — Anti-government demonstrations erupt across Sudan, initially over steep price rises and shortages, but soon shift to calls for al-Bashir to step down. Security forces respond with a fierce crackdown that kills dozens.

Feb. 19, 2019 — Al-Bashir declares a state of emergency, bans all unauthorized gatherings and gives security forces sweeping powers to quash the protests.

April 6 — A large sit-in protest begins outside the military's headquarters in Khartoum. Over the next five days, security forces kill 22 people in attempts to clear the sit-in. The protests gain momentum after the resignation earlier in the week by Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power for 20 years, in response to similar demonstrations.

April 11 — Sudanese army arrests al-Bashir and says it takes over for the next 2 years, suspending the country's constitution and closing its borders and airspace. A three-month state of emergency is also imposed.

April 12 — Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan replaces the coup leader who is linked to the bloodshed in Darfur, Awad Mohammed Ibn Ouf, after street rallies against him.

April 17 — Sudanese officials say al-Bashir has been transferred to a prison in Khartoum.

April 21 — Protest organizers suspend talks with the ruling military council, saying it has failed to meet their demands for an immediate transfer to a civilian government.

April 25 — Under pressure from mounting protests, three members of the ruling military council resign.

April 27 — Protest leaders resume talks with the ruling military council.

May 13 — Sudanese prosecutors say they have charged al-Bashir with involvement in killing and incitement to kill protesters during the uprising.

May 14 — Protesters says security agents loyal to ousted leader al-Bashir attacked their sit-ins overnight, setting off clashes that killed five people, including an army officer.

May 15 — Army and opposition leaders announce significant progress in negotiations a three-year transition period, a Cabinet and the makeup of a 300-member, all-civilian transitional legislative body.

May 25 — Thousands of Islamists, long allied with al-Bashir's regime, rally to support military-backed Islamic rule in Khartoum.

May 28 — Protest leaders launch a two-day general strike to press the army to hand over power to a civilian-led authority.

June 3 — Protest leaders say security forces attack their Khartoum sit-in at the center of the movement, opening fire, torching tents and killing over 30 people.


Resumption of Civil War

In May 1983, contrary to the Addis Ababa agreement that had ended the southern separatist war by setting up an autonomous Southern Region, President Nimeiri split the Southern Region into three and revoked its autonomous powers. 127 His dissolution of the southern government, passage of shari’a laws in September 1983, and the short-shifting of the south in his handling of economic resources particularly the oil, were prominent among reasons for renewed civil war. 128 Already in 1982, some Nuer and Dinka soldiers in Wangkei base had rebelled and taken their guns to Ethiopia to join the nascent separatist rebel movement called Anyanya II. 129

In May 1983, the Sudanese army’s 105 th Battalion, consisting mostly of ex-Anyanya southern forces and located at Bor, Upper Nile province, mutinied. They were discontented because of threats to transfer them to the north, away from their home area, and because of a salary dispute with headquarters. 130 Due to political differences and miscalculations, this escalated into an attack by Sudanese army loyalists on the 105 th Battalion headquarters in Bor. The rebellious105 th Battalion, under the command of Sudanese army officer Maj. Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, fled to Ethiopia, where it was shortly joined by Sudanese army Col. John Garang de Mabior. 131 Later the 104 th Battalion at Ayod, Upper Nile, commanded by former Anyanya officer William Nyuong Bapiny, and others in the 105 th Batallion garrisons in Pibor and Pachalla, left for Ethiopia to join the struggle. 132

Formation of SPLM/A in Ethiopia, 1983

At the time, Bor was only one of a series of mutinies of former Anyanya from the government army. 133 But the Bor mutiny led to the founding of the SPLM/A by Col. John Garang, Maj. Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, Lt. Col. Samuel Gai (Nath) Tut, and others. 134 From its inception, the SPLM/A was, in effect, an army, defecting in battalions, southern in origin. Over the years prior to 1983, small numbers of Nuer and Dinka soldiers, police, and civil servants had gradually joined the Anyanya II nucleus in Ethiopia, 135 and were initially incorporated into the new movement.

The SPLM/A was sponsored, housed, supplied, and trained by the repressive government of Pres. Mengistu Haile Miriam of Ethiopia. Ethiopia was reciprocating Sudan’s own efforts. Ethiopia had warned Sudan as early as 1976 that if Sudan did not stop supporting Ethiopian and Eritrean dissidents, Ethiopia would support Sudanese dissidents. 136 With the Cold War at its height, Ethiopia was aligned with the Soviet Union and Cuba, while Sudan was aligned with the United States. President Nimeiri’s dictatorship received considerable aid from the U.S. The SPLM/A received arms, training, and other assistance from the Soviet bloc and sent thousands of southern and Nuba boy soldiers and adult officers to Cuba for military and academic education. 137

Colonel Garang’s call for a united, secular, socialist Sudan was a non-secessionist goal consistent with that of the Ethiopian ruling council, the Derg. Anyanya II, like its predecessor, called for southern independence.

In Ethiopia, political, leadership, and personality problems cropped up within the rebel movement between the two factions in the SPLM/A, one led by Lt. Col. Samuel Gai and Maj. William Abdallah Chuol the Anyanya II separatist faction and the other by Colonel Garang. The SPLA fought its first battles against Anyanya II. Although Anyanya II was driven out of Ethiopia and some leaders killed, it did not dissolve but became a predominantly Nuer militia taking arms from the Sudanese government and fighting the SPLA. Anyanya II was particularly useful to the Sudanese government because of its location along the route from Bahr El Ghazal to the Ethiopian border, where it attacked SPLA recruits on their way to Ethiopian training camps. It also intercepted and fought the trained SPLA troops proceeding from their bases in Ethiopia. 138

Government Use of the Baggara as a Forced Displacement Tool, 1980s

Following the southern mutiny and the resumption ofwar in 1983, both governments of dictator Jafa’ar Nimeiri (1969-85) and elected Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi of the Umma Party (1986-89) took steps to counter rebellious southern groups and to protect the areas of oil exploration by favoring Arab ethnic groups in the “transition zone” of Sudan between north and south. Both governments armed the militia of the Baggara nomadic cattle herders of southern Kordofan and Darfur, the muraheleen, 139 with automatic weapons. The Baggara began to use their new weapons to loot cattle and force the Dinka and Nuer from their land and pastures. The Baggara already had an advantage over their Dinka and Nuer neighbors, in that the Baggara had horses whereas southerners could not keep horses because of the inhospitable climate.

In the north of Western Upper Nile, the government used displacement to make the area “safe” for foreign and northern-based exploitation of oil. The Heglig oil location (in Block 2) was not densely populated, but Dinka lived dispersed in the whole Heglig area and moved their cattle tocattle camps in that same region, according to contemporary accounts, the memories of former residents, and older maps. 140

The government permitted the muraheleen to operate unchecked in Dinka and Nuer areas in order to (1) deflect the political threat posed by the marginalized but potentially threatening Baggara by allowing them to reap profits from looting their richer neighbors to the south (2) defeat southern rebels and (3) gain access to southern resources such as oil, water, and grazing lands in the context of a growing economic and environmental crisis in the north. 141 The government did not pay the Baggara anything much for their raids, but gave their militia a license to steal from the Nuer and Dinka: cattle, grain, household goods and women and children, taken as slaves. Notably, after the civil war resumed, the government stopped intervening in raids and calling tribal conferences to resolve conflicts between Baggara and the Nuer and Dinka. 142

In the early 1980s, the Baggara stepped up their fights with the Ngok Dinka of Abyei, southern Kordofan, over water and grazing the Baggara’s home areas periodically suffered drought and were undergoing desertification and a famine in 1984. They thoroughly looted and displaced these Ngok Dinka of Kordofan, many of whom became displaced persons south of the Bahr al Arab River, in the Bahr al Ghazal territory of their Twic Dinka cousins. 143 Even there, Baggara assaults kept and keep the displaced Ngok Dinka and their Twic Dinka cousins on the run. 144

The next line of Baggara attack during those early years followed known watering routes southeast, through Western Upper Nile. Entering from the westerly direction of Abiemnon at the beginning of the dry season in December or January, when the roads were dry enough for their horses, the muraheleen displaced small isolated villages in Dinka areas of Western Upper Nile throughout the early 1980s. They pierced through to Leek Nuer territory and displaced villages there also.

According to a church development worker based in Bentiu and Mayom, in about 1982 the Baggara began showing up in the Mayom area with automatic weapons and became more aggressive. That year the Baggara took about 500 Nuer and Dinka cattle from the Heglig/Unity/Mayom region, and ran back north. 145

A young Nuer man told how on two occasions in the 1980s the muraheleen came on horses and raided his village, Rang (two hours north of Bentiu on foot): 146

In the beginning, we had no guns. . . . The muraheleen were shooting at people, who scattered. Then the muraheleen took the cows and left. Sometimes they captured children playing in the forest. Those children never returned. The muraheleen wore long white robes, and had guns. They came once a year but our people did not move. 147

The muraheleen burned down the huts and grain, but these Nuer did not leave until the “Arab soldiers came footing [sic], in uniform,” the Nuer man explained. “They were coming quietly, then they started shooting without saying anything.” The soldiers also came twice, destroying the village and taking the cows. But the second time they set up a base in the village. The narrator was then sixteen. “The soldiers did not tell us to move but we saw them shoot civilians, and this was too much for us. My brothers were killed, the younger and the elder. They were in the luak [cattle byre].” 148

Inside the current Block 4, west of Bentiu, and probably not far from what later became an oilfield, there were schools attended by hundreds of Leek Nuer children in 1983, according to the man who then served as school administrator. 149 These Nuer were pushed by the Baggara to cross the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) River for safety. The school administrator said:

The Baggara looted the Nuer cattle, and sold it to traders. They killed people, abducted girls and boys to be slaves, and sold some to Libya. If a person were lucky, his children would be in Khartoum. Most of those abducted disappeared. This started . . . when the government of Sudan gave guns to the Baggara. 150

The schools the administrator was managing closed from 1983 until 1991 because the Baggara raiders destroyed them. Whole Nuer communities fled many families were separated. Most young Nuer men went to Bilpam, an SPLA military base in Ethiopia, “for training to protect their land,” the school administrator said. 151 “The Baggara Misseriya came from Abiemnon, which was an Ngok Dinka area. They pushed the Dinka to Bul Nuer areas.” 152

The administrator recalled that:

Before the discovery of oil, chiefs on both sides would negotiate their differences, in 1965 and 1967. After that, there was no negotiation because the government of Sudan prevented that. The government of Sudan at Bentiu took no action to protect any Nuer or Dinka from the raids. They called it a “cool war,” a political war, which kills people indirectly. 153

Thus, the Leek Nuer fled from north of the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) and Bahr Al Arab Rivers, down to the area south of Bentiu. Some Ruweng (Panaru) Dinka moved far away, south and west to Bahr El Ghazal province. Both Nuer and Dinka tended to go to relatives where possible, and to put a river between themselves and the Baggara for protection. 154

According to Taban Deng Gai, the governor of Unity State (Western Upper Nile) from 1997-1999, 155 the attacks on the Nuer in Western Upper Nile followed government demands that the Nuer population leave the areas north of the river:

The Leek Nuer lived north of Bentiu, in what are now the Unity and Heglig oilfields. In 1983 they were told to move by the central government, to cross the [Bahr El Ghazal or Nam] River. They received no compensation. Their names were registered for “later on.” 156

Many contemporaneous reports confirm the expulsion of Nuer and Dinka from the early oilfield areas of Western Upper Nile. Anthropologist Sharon E. Hutchinson lived in Tharlual, where a Leek Nuer chief resided, during her fieldwork among the Leek Nuer in the early 1980s. 157 She described their clearance:

By late 1984 I had learned that my principal field sites in both eastern and western Nuerland had been destroyed. Tharlual had been overrun and razed by a band of northern Baggara (Misseriya) Arabs that had been armed with automatic weapons and ammunition by the government and instructed to clear the oil-rich lands of the Western Upper Nile of its Nilotic inhabitants. 158

Africa Watch, now the Africa division of Human Rights Watch, reported that the muraheleen, active in 1983 and 1984, were “raiding into north-west Upper Nile, and devastating [the] Leek [Nuer].” 159

A large pocket of Ruweng (Panaru) Dinka, who kept few cattle and were more sedentary, remained in the northeastern corner of Western Upper Nile/Unity State in Block 1-Block 5A. They were affected by government-armed muraheleen raiding starting in about 1983 by 1993, residents told a relief assessment team, they had few cattle because they had been taken in “Arab cattle raids” since the beginning of the war. The team observed very few cattle and goats in this whole Dinka area.

Perhaps as much as 70 percent of the population surveyed in 1993 in this part of Ruweng (Panaru) County had died in the previous four years (1989-93) because of displacement, migration, and disease, primarily kala azar, a wasting disease, according to those conducting the 1993 evaluation. 160 The Dinka residents were exposed to kala azar when they began hiding in the acacia forest nearby for safety from the murahaleen raids. 161 This epidemic started in the (western) Jikany area, south of the Bahr El Ghazal (Nam) River, in the mid-1980s, spreading north from the Nuer population to the Dinka area of Ruweng (Panaru) County in the late 1980s. MSF finally estimated that about 100,000 people had died from kala azar in Western Upper Nile/Unity State since 1984, as a result of the war. 162

Southern politicians at the time saw a close link between the displacement and oil. Abel Alier, former head of the southern regional government, wrote that Chevron attempted to support these muraheleen as a way to protect the oilfields:

[T]he role of oil in South-North politics was further developed when Chevron made concerted attempts to support the activities of Southern Kordofan based armed militia [muraheleen] to secure protection of the oilfields in Bentiu Area Council to make exploitation and further prospecting possible. All oilfield areas were practically cleared of civilians in 1985-86 some of [the civilians] returned to the area in 1988 under the protection of the SPLA. 163

Africa Watch noted that the muraheleen operating in the area in the early 1980s had been “organized by the government to protect Chevron’s oilfields in Bentiu.” 164 A journalist based in Khartoum at the time wrote that in early 1984 a special “Oilfields Protection Force” was established at Chevron’s request and that until at least late 1984 Chevron was providing substantial support to these troops. According to her, the battalion was based not in the oilfields (Heglig and Unity) but further north, in El Muglad, and was under the command of the son of General Abboud, the late military dictator. 165 Years later, in 1988, the troops were sent to Rubkona near Bentiu to re-secure the oilfields and put pressure on Chevron to fulfill its concession obligations. 166


Where it all started

The National Congress Party, which al-Bashir ran, was borne out of the Sudanese Islamic Movement formed during the 1950s. The movement originated as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, then founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928. The central drive was the creation of an Islamic state based on Sharia law.

After Sudan’s independence in 1956, the Sudanese Islamic Movement focused on spreading Wahhabism, a conservative Sunni religious interpretation of Islam viewed as being far-right in its religious interpretation.

During this period the Sudanese Islamic Movement acted as a pressure group through civil societies, charities and trade unions. It pushed for Sharia law and an Islamic republic. But its plans were stopped when Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiri carried out a coup in 1969.

A coup attempt seven years later led Jaafar Nimeiri to adopt more conciliatory policies. In early 1977, government officials met with the National Front in London and arranged for a conference between Jaafar Nimeiri and Sadiq al-Mahdi in Port Sudan. This became known as the “national reconciliation”. The two leaders signed an eight point agreement that readmitted the opposition to national life in return for the dissolution of the National Front.

The agreement called for the restoration of civil liberties, the freeing of political prisoners and reaffirmation of Sudan’s nonaligned foreign policy. There was also an undertaking to reform local government. The deal led to 1,000 detainees being released. This included Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. Al-Mahdi was granted amnesty. As a result, al-Mahdi renounced multiparty politics and urged his followers to work within the regime’s one-party system.

The consequence was that the Sudanese Islamic Movement became embedded throughout Sudan’s institutions. This extended to the military, intelligence services, and other bureaucracies with support from Saudi Arabia.

In 1983, Jaafar Nimeiri imposed Sharia law in a bid to shore up legitimacy. This led to the start of the second Sudanese war with the Sudanese People Liberation Movement. Jaafar Nimeiri was ousted in 1985 and al-Mahdi took over.

Over the next decade the Sudanese Islamic Movement would go on to restructure itself into the National Islamic Front with a renewed focus on Sharia law. Pressure mounted on al-Mahdi’s government not to repeal the September laws. But he did anyway, which resulted in a coup in 1989, heralding al-Bashir and National Islamic Front to power.

The Sudanese Islamic Movement would later divide into two groups the National Congress Party under al-Bashir as chairman and the Popular Congress Party led by al-Turabi until his death in 2016.


Sudan's Military Says It Has Taken Control And Arrested President Omar Al-Bashir

Sudanese soldiers stand guard on armored vehicles as demonstrators protest against President Omar al-Bashir's regime near the army headquarters in the Sudanese capital Khartoum Thursday. AFP/Getty Images ocultar leyenda

Sudanese soldiers stand guard on armored vehicles as demonstrators protest against President Omar al-Bashir's regime near the army headquarters in the Sudanese capital Khartoum Thursday.

Updated at noon ET

A military council has taken control of Sudan and arrested its longtime president, Omar al-Bashir, the country's military said Thursday. The move comes after opposition protesters recently gained new momentum in demanding al-Bashir leave office.

Sudan's defense minister, Awad Mohamed Ahmed Ibn Auf, said the "regime" had been removed and its head arrested, as he announced the coup in a televised statement.

The minister said a transitional military council will rule the country for two years before any democratic elections will take place.

Sudan awoke early to word from the state news agency that the military would be making an announcement — news that sent thousands of people flooding to the site where protesters have been calling for al-Bashir's ouster for months.

There has been so much anticipation for this moment, NPR's Halima Gikandi reports, that "some people were cheering but not really knowing what they were cheering for, and what was going to happen." In one sign of change, activists said many of their colleagues had been released from state prisons.

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For protesters, the moment is bittersweet. Their primary demand has been for al-Bashir to step down. But their second demand was for a transitional government to move the country toward a democracy — and on Thursday, there were no indications of that happening.

The woman who has become an icon of the protests, Alaa Salah, tweeted that the military's announcement was unacceptable: "The people do not want a transitional military council. Change will not happen with Bashir's entire regime hoodwinking Sudanese civilians through a military coup. We want a civilian council to head the transition."

It's unclear what will happen next, but many Sudanese fear a military takeover. And with a number of military forces and government agencies now free to assert themselves, the political picture seems more complicated than ever.

"On one hand, you have the army, which in the past few days has been seeming to protect protesters," Gikandi explains. "And on the other hand, you have the national intelligence agency, which has been known to have done human rights violations. So what does it mean now for demonstrators to be seeing that the military is taking over, and installing a two-year transitional government, consisting of all of those various intelligence agencies?"

The opposition protests began in December over the price of bread, after the government ended subsidies. But the demonstrations soon spread to political concerns, and protesters demanded al-Bashir's ouster. Since Saturday, tens of thousands have maintained a protest vigil near the military headquarters in Sudan's capital, Khartoum.

The country's armed forces have been deployed around the capital's main roads and bridges, the BBC reports, and the city's main airport is closed.

The Sudanese Professionals Association, the civil society group that has led protests since December, had called on residents to mobilize on Thursday for a sit-in. The group tweeted that the military leadership must "hand over power to the people."

Sudan's current crisis "cannot be addressed through another military coup," the group said. The SPA called for protests to continue until power is handed over to a civil transitional government.

"We will not accept Bashir's aides as part of the new situation," protester Mohamed Adam told Reuters. "Those people have killed protesters."

Media reports say the current swell of protesters is largely peaceful. The SPA said it advocated a peaceful "approach to revolution and change."

Sudanese security forces killed at least 14 people on Tuesday, NPR previously reported. But according to the BBC, the army stepped in to protect protesters from at least two attacks by forces loyal to al-Bashir.

His ouster comes just a week after Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika resigned, following weeks of mass protests against his 20-year rule. Since 2011, a number of the Arab world's longest-serving leaders have lost power: Tunisia's Ben Ali, Libya's Moammar Gadhafi, Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, and now Bouteflika and al-Bashir.

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Now all eyes are on the Sudanese military, which has a long history of coups in the country.

Sudan gained independence from the U.K. and Egypt in 1956. Just two years later, chief of staff Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud took power in a bloodless coup.

Riots and strikes in 1964 led to the military giving up control.

But Col. Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiri led a second military coup in 1969, according to the U.S. State Department's history. Nimeiri became prime minister, and the military banned political parties and dissolved parliament. He survived multiple coup attempts before succumbing to another military coup in 1985.

Gen. Abdel Rahman Swar al-Dahab led the military overthrow of Nimeiri in that coup. This time the military handed over power to a civilian government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi after elections in 1986.

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Protesters Across Sudan Continue To Call For President's Ouster

Al-Mahdi only lasted three years in power afterward. Al-Bashir, with the support of military officers and an Islamist political party, took power as leader of a junta in his own coup on June 30, 1989.

Al-Bashir had been in power almost 30 years. The International Criminal Court in the Hague issued warrants for al-Bashir's arrest in 2009 and 2010 for genocide and crimes against humanity in Sudan's Darfur region.

But those arrest warrants have not been carried out, with al-Bashir traveling to South Africa in 2015 and Chad in 2010 and returning home.


Ver el vídeo: Sudan: History of a Broken Land